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The central notion of the book is that 
the Western approach to warfare has 
remained wedged in the past, while 
the character of warfare has changed 
since WWII, and particularly since 
the Cold War. The author offers some 
original perspectives and solutions to 
be used in adapting to the “new form” 
of warfare. The book, therefore, may 
be seen as a Western contribution 
to considerations on future warfare, 
previously described in publications 
such as the Chinese Unrestricted 
Warfare (written by Qiao Liang and 
Wang Xiangsui), and concepts such as 
the Russian New Generation Warfare. 
Strategically inclined readers should 
be advised from the beginning that this 
book does not represent a strictly academic approach to strategy. If someone 
expects to see the writing style of Colin S. Gray or Beatrice Heuser, be aware 
that this book is not of that type. It is instead an apotheosis of strategizing 
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as an art, rather than a science. The author uses in abundance his common 
sense, experience and observations, including examples and illustrations in 
the form of dialogues. 
The style of writing, however, should not deceive “serious” readers. Sean 
McFate is Professor of Strategy at the National Defense University and 
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Washington D.C. He 
was a commissioned officer who served in the US Army’s 82nd Airborne 
Division and as a private military contractor in Africa. His competences and 
professional experience contribute enormously to his plausibility regarding 
the topics he elaborates.
McFate primarily criticizes the rigidity of Western strategic thinking and its 
overreliance on “traditional” military approaches, its conventional military 
forces and doctrines, including overspending on technologically advanced 
platforms. These approaches, McFate claims, have proved to be inadequate 
for winning wars since 1945. He seems to be slightly disappointed, sometimes 
even ironic, in describing some failed approaches used by Western decision-
makers, and their strategic and defence planners. The author primarily 
criticizes US decision-makers (regarding campaigns in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq 
and Afghanistan) but also those from France (concerning engagements in 
Indochina and Algeria) and Israel (regarding the 2006 Lebanon war).
In the author’s view, not only are contemporary conflicts approached in the 
wrong way, but the strategic foresight and thinking about the character of 
future wars are equally problematic. In the USA, he points out ironically, 
thinking about the warfare of the future is influenced almost exclusively by 
Hollywood (e.g. sci-fi movies) rather than by genuine futurists of warfare. 
However, the incapacity of establishments to recognize, evaluate and 
empower genuine “futurists” and to recognize their talents is not new. 
McFate vividly describes the cases of generals William Lendrum Mitchell 
and John Frederick Charles Fuller, both ahead of their time in understanding 
the trends of future warfare (the former regarding the role of air power and 
the latter concerning the role of armour/tanks). 
The strength of the book stems from the author’s capacity to “digest” 
strategic issues, such as the character of contemporary conflict, the meaning 
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of strategy, the meaning of victory, proper identification of the requirements 
in defence capabilities, the role of technology and the emergence of new 
actors in international relations. The considerations regarding strategic 
incompetence and durable disorder are particularly attractive. The author 
also provides some precious insights into grand strategy, elaborating its 
purpose and current (overly bureaucratic) approaches to its development.
McFate is confident and provocative as he challenges the mainstream 
mindset. His views may challenge the stereotypical Western approaches to 
the development of warfare as children did in The Emperor’s New Clothes. 
For the author, the situation is clear: the Western militaries are “naked”, 
despite all the power and capabilities they retain. The new approach to war, 
with its disinformation campaigns, propaganda, secret covert operations 
and attacks on infrastructure, as McFate implies, cannot be undertaken 
in a “Napoleonic” way. However, while the author is good at identifying 
issues, the arguments or solutions that he offers sometimes do not stand up 
to elementary scrutiny (e.g. the thesis that warfare is becoming a mercenary 
business). Another weakness of the book is its scope. The author examines 
the US military (its strategies and engagements) primarily but implicitly 
addresses Western militaries. While some conclusions in the book apply to 
Western militaries in general, the role of the USA in NATO, and the broader 
geopolitical perspectives are missing. 
The content is organized around the fundamental premise that the present 
situation in the global security environment can be characterized as “durable 
disorder”. “Durable disorder” apparently encompasses often-used adjectives 
to describe the contemporary security environment such as “complex”, 
“uncertain”, “fluid” and “volatile”. McFate argues that the principal 
feature of that environment is persistent and perpetual conflict. He asks 
provocatively “Why has America stopped winning wars?” despite the fact 
that a huge proportion of the US national treasure goes toward the care and 
feeding of a large war machine. The author finds the answer neither in the 
military, strictly speaking, nor as part of party politics. He sees the problem 
as endemically American, one that results from “strategic incompetence”. 
For McFate, the key problem is the inability to understand the character of 
(contemporary) war and the modern adversary’s strategies. Actors such as 
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Russia, China, Iran, terrorist organizations and drug cartels, all of whom have 
less money and firepower than the US, are more effective in the new forms of 
warfare. They use non-conventional methods, such as strategic subversion, 
information campaigns, a covert proxy or “shadow” wars, which may 
include private mercenaries, economic warfare, terrorist attacks and strategic 
manipulation of laws (“lawfare”) to further their agendas. At the same time, 
the US approach is mainly focused on preparation for conventional warfare, 
which the author recognizes in decisions that justify investments in costly 
platforms, such as the US multi-role fighter the F-35, aircraft carriers and 
new (disruptive) technologies as a part of the Third Offset. 
The book is organized into 13 main chapters, preceded by a foreword by 
retired US general, Stanley McChrystal. It starts with the author’s thesis 
of Strategic Atrophy, followed by his view on Why Do We Get War Wrong? 
The chapters that follow are what the author calls “ten rules”, including: 
“Conventional War is Dead”, “Technology Will Not Save Us”, “There Is No Such 
Thing as War or Peace − Both Coexist. Always”, “Hearts and Minds Do Not 
Matter”, “The Best Weapons Do Not Fire Bullets”, “Mercenaries Will Return”, 
“New Types of World Powers Will Rule”, “There will Be Wars without States”, 
“Shadow Wars Will Dominate” and “Victory Is Fungible”. The last chapter, 
“Winning the Future”, comprises a conclusion and the author’s view on the 
meaning of winning in “durable disorder”.
“Ten rules” do not seem to be rules for action or direct application but 
rather assumptions one should hold as authoritative when contemplating 
actions and decisions (e.g. for strategy development, defence planning 
etc.). For example, the first “rule” is articulated around the assumption 
that conventional warfare is dead. This, logically, leads to the conclusion 
that the West (or rather the USA) does not need that many conventional 
military capabilities. This is the point where many non-US readers may 
find themselves hesitant about agreeing with the author. In other words, 
McFate’s arguments may prove valid for the USA but European countries, 
especially those in northern and eastern Europe, see things differently, 
particularly since 2014. McFate does not, however, elaborate on this return 
of realpolitik with assertive actors such as Russia (to include examples of 
Russian engagement in Georgia and Ukraine). 
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We may argue that, just because the risk of high-intensity armed conflict on 
European soil has been low since the Cold War (except for wars in former 
Yugoslavia), conventional military capabilities have not become obsolete. 
This turned out to be true particularly in and after 2014, with the outbreak of 
the Ukraine crisis. For Europeans and NATO, their conventional capabilities 
are an indispensable element of their deterring capabilities. We may also say 
that these capabilities contribute to non-escalation of strategic competition 
to an open armed conflict (i.e. keep them “below the threshold”). This kind 
of “spectral analysis”, in which threats to the security environment should 
not be seen as isolated, but considered in their complex relations, in the 
possibility of emerging simultaneously, is something that is missing in the 
book.
To corroborate his assumption, the author mostly uses US experience from 
counter-insurgency operations (COIN), along with challenges that emerged 
from the “new form” of Russian and Chinese strategic behaviour (described 
often as hybrid warfare or the “grey zone”). McFate implicitly shows that 
the USA focuses too much on military forces (power) and conventional 
capabilities while Russian and Chinese strategies use military forces as 
just one of the instruments for achieving their goals, and as a rule, often 
as a means of political pressure. Apparently, an attempt to use exclusively 
conventional military forces and approaches (doctrines and training) to 
respond to contemporary challenges would prove false and inadequate. 
In conclusion, the book should not be considered a set of recipes or a new 
methodology for defence planning and strategy development as it has not 
been written that way. Instead, the author provides a set of indicators and 
principles that should be taken into consideration while thinking about 
defence and military strategy. It is an excellent source of thoughts for scenario 
analysis, alternative analysis and approaches to challenge our mindset. 
The publication represents a valuable contribution to new approaches to 
understanding the character of contemporary and future warfare. The author 
recognizes the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of US (and consequently 
Western) strategic thinking. The book is certainly not a handbook, and 
hardly useful for “ordinary thinkers” in strategy development. However, 
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I highly recommend the book to all professionals in national security and 
defence, and all others, willing to expand their views in thinking about 
future warfare. Moreover, it is an attractive piece of work for those ready 
to enjoy reading views and perspectives that may even be their own but are 
brilliantly articulated by Sean McFate.
